Obstruction of the Due Administration of Justice

(1) 18 U.S.C. § 1505 -

18 U.S.C. § 1505 provides, in pertinent part, that:. . . .

Whoever corruptly, . . . , obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, . . . [shall be guilty of an offense against the United States punishable by a fine, up to five years imprisonment, or both].

To prove obstruction of an agency proceeding under § 1505, the government must establish that (1) there was a proceeding pending before a department or agency of the United States; (2) the defendant knew of or believed that the proceeding was pending; and (3) the defendant corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which the proceeding was pending. Materiality is not an element of obstruction of justice. Nor is it a requirement that a defendant succeed in his endeavor to obstruct. Rather, it is sufficient that the defendant has made an effort to accomplish the evil purpose outlawed by the statute. Courts have consistently held that investigations conducted by federal agencies are proceedings for purposes of prosecutions under § 1505.

(2) 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) -

It is a violation of § 1512(b)(3) whenever a person "uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to ... hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense." A conviction for violating § 1512(b)(3) is punishable by a fine and up to ten years imprisonment, or both. To prove a violation of § 1512(b)(3), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant (1) knowingly and willfully engaged in misleading conduct toward another person, (2) with the intent to hinder, delay or prevent the communication of information to a federal official, (3) about the commission or the possible commission of a federal crime.

The federal interest § 1512(b)(3) protects relates to the character of the affected activity, and the transmission of information to federal law enforcement agents and/or a federal judge concerning a possible federal crime. Thus, § 1512(b)(3) seeks to promote the communication of truthful information to federal authorities regarding a possible federal crimes. Significantly, for purposes of § 1512 prosecutions, "no state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance" that the law enforcement officer or judge is a federal agent or federal judge or serving as a federal advisor or consultant. To prove an offense under § 1512(b)(3) it is sufficient if the misleading information is likely to be transferred to a federal agent. As such, § 1512(b)(3) applies even if the evidence shows that a defendant has misled only state investigators, if there existed "the possibility or likelihood that their false and misleading information would be transferred to federal authorities."

(3) 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) -

18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) provides that:

(c) [w]hoever corruptly - . . . . . .

(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so [shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both].

Like § 1512(b)(3), the focus of § 1512(c)(2) is on a specific step in the criminal investigatory process, namely the "communication" or "reporting" of information to criminal investigators.

Section 1512(c)(2) was added to the United States Code in 2002 as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Section 1503 remains on the books and nearly every case dealing with the crime of obstruction of justice is an interpretation of § 1503. Sections 1503 and 1512 are distinct statutes. Although it is likely that Congress intended the scope of § 1512(c)(2) to be broader in scope than § 1503, there is no indication that Congress intended there to be any difference in the mens rea requirements of the two statutes. Therefore, cases dealing with § 1503 are instructive in dealing with § 1512(c). . .

To obtain a conviction under § 1512(c)(2) the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) knowingly; (2) corruptly obstructed, influenced and impeded, or attempted to do so; (3) an official proceeding.

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